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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
DEE BLAIN, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
WAL-MART STORES, INC., 
Defendant and Appellee. 
District Court No. 970400626PI 
Court of Appeals No. 990235-CA 
Priority No. 15 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (1996). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
A. Whether the trial court correctly determined that Utah law 
requires Appellant to attach supportive evidence to her Memorandum in 
Opposition to Appellee's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
B. Whether the trial court correctly determined that Appellant 
failed to produce sufficient evidence to make out a prima facie case of 
negligence against Appellee. 
C. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in ruling that 
Appellant's failure to attach supporting evidence to her Motion in 
Opposition to Summary Judgment is not the type of mistake or inadvertence 
that merits relief under Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
II. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
In reviewing a Motion for Summary Judgment, an appellate court 
accords no deference to a trial court's legal conclusions but examines them 
for correctness. Butterfield v. Okubo. 831 P.2d 97 (Utah 1992); Schurtz 
v. BMW of North Am.. Inc.. 814 P.2d 1108 (Utah 1991). 
In considering a Motion for Relief based on Rule 60(b) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, the Utah Supreme Court has held that the trial 
court has wide discretion in determining whether a party has demonstrated 
"mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect." Larsen v. Collins. 
C \WP51\WAL-MART\BLAIN\appeal documents\bnet_appellee wpd 
684 P.2d 52, 54 (Utah 1984). The trial court's ruling denying a rule 60(b) 
motion will not be reversed unless there has been an abuse of discretion. 
Id. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, 
ORDINANCES, RULES AND REGULATIONS 
Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 60(b) is 
attached in the Addendum as Exhibit "A." 
Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 56(c) is 
attached in the Addendum as Exhibit "B." 
Rule 56(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 56(e) is 
attached in the Addendum as Exhibit "B." 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case arose from an injury allegedly sustained as the result of a 
slip and fall of Plaintiff and Appellant, Dee Blain ("Blain"), in a retail store 
operated by Defendant and Appellee, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. ("Wal-Mart") 
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on September 25, 1995. (Complaint at 1; R. 4). The subject grocery store 
is located in Utah County, State of Utah (Id.)-
II. 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION IN THE 
TRIAL COURT 
On or about August 8, 1997, Blain filed her Complaint in the Fourth 
Judicial District Court, Civil No. 970400626 PI. (Complaint at 4; R. 4). 
On or about September 5, 1997, Wal-Mart filed its Answer to Blain's 
Complaint. (Answer at 4; R. 15). On or about December 10, 1998, Wal-
Mart filed its Motion for Summary Judgment and Memorandum in Support 
of Motion for Summary Judgment. (Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment at 2; R. 66; Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion for 
Summary Judgment at 12; R. 103). On or about January 11, 1999, Blain 
filed her Response to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and on 
about February 9, 1999, Wal-Mart filed its Reply Memorandum. (Plaintiff's 
Response to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment at 9, R. 113; 
Defendant's Reply Memorandum at 16, R. 167). The trial court granted 
Wal-Mart's Motion for Summary Judgment on February 9, 1999. 
4 
C \WP51 \WAL-MART\BLAIN\appeal documents\bnet_appellee wpd ^ 
(Memorandum Decision Order granting Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment at 3, attached in Addendum as Exhibit "C"; R. 177). 
On or about March 9, 1999, pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b), Blain 
filed a Motion for Relief from Order and a Memorandum in Support of 
Motion. (Motion for Relief from Order at 1; R. 179; Memorandum in 
Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Relief from Order at 8; R. 187). Wal-Mart 
filed a Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Rule 60(b) Motion for 
Relief from Order on March 17, 1999. (Memorandum in Opposition to 
Plaintiffs Rule 60(b) Motion for Relief from Order at 13; R. 210). On 
March 24, 1999, the trial court issued its ruling denying Blain's motion. 
(Ruling at 1; R. 211). The next day, the trial court received Blain's timely 
Reply Memorandum to Wal-Mart's Memorandum in Opposition to Blain's 
60(b) motion. (Reply Memorandum at 5; R. 245). After considering 
Blain's Reply Memorandum, the trial court found no reason to change its 
March 4 ruling and again denied Blain's Rule 60(b) Motion for Relief. 
(Ruling at 1; R. 248). 
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On March 5, 1999, Blain filed a Notice of Appeal to the Utah 
Supreme Court, appealing the Order granting Wal-Mart's summary 
judgment. (Notice of Appeal at 1; R. 189). On or about May 26, 1999, 
Blain filed a second Notice of Appeal, this time appealing the trial court's 
denial of Blain's Rule 60(b) Motion for Relief. (Notice of Appeal at 2; R. 
260). 
On or about July 6, 1999, Blain filed a Motion for Summary 
Disposition with the Utah Supreme Court asking that the Utah Supreme 
Court reverse the District Court decision on the basis that the trial court 
committed manifest error in making the decision. (Motion for Summary 
Disposition; Appellant's Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support 
of Her Motion for Summary Reversal). Wal-Mart subsequently filed a 
Memorandum in Opposition and Blain filed a Reply Memorandum. 
(Appellee Wal-Mart Stores' Memorandum in Opposition to Appellant's 
Motion for Summary Disposition; Appellant Dee Blain's Reply 
Memorandum to Appellee Wal-Mart Stores' Responsive Memorandum to 
Appellant's Motion for Summary Disposition). 
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This Court subsequently issued an Order denying and deferring 
Blain's motion for summary disposition. (Order dated August 26, 1999). 
Finally, this Court issued an Order consolidating Case No. 990235-CA and 
Case No. 990558-CA into the current Case No. 990235-CA. (Order of 
Consolidation at 1; R. 272). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. This case arose as the result of a slip and fall that 
allegedly occurred on September 25, 1995, in the Wal-Mart store in Orem, 
Utah. (Complaint at 1; R. 4). 
2. At the time of the occurrence, Blain was accompanied by 
her daughter, Sheri Anderson. (Id). Blain and her daughter had completed 
their shopping and were walking toward the cashier stands to pay for their 
purchases. (Deposition of Dee Blain at 11; R. 88). As the two shopping 
companions were walking, Blain alleges that she slipped in detergent that 
had been spilled on the floor of the Wal-Mart store. (Id. at 22; R. 82). 
3. Blain's daughter testified that they did not know how long 
the substance had been on the floor, or where it came from, or whether any 
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Wal-Mart employee was aware of the spill prior to Blain's fall. 
(Deposition of Sheri L. Anderson at 31; R. 79). 
4. Blain testified that she was stunned by the fall and that she 
remained on the floor after the fall for about 10 to 15 minutes. (Deposition 
of Dee Blain at 15 - 17; R. 83 - 85). 
5. Melia Lei O'Hawaii White Freeman was employed at 
Wal-Mart as a department manager in the fabrics section on the day of 
Blain's fall. (Deposition of Melia Freeman at 8; R. 75). 
6. On the day of Blain's fall, Ms. Freeman was working in 
one of the aisles when she noticed a couple of small wet spots on the floor. 
(Id. at 33; R. 74). She then retrieved some paper towels and began wiping 
up what she saw. (Id.). 
7. As Ms. Freeman wiped the spots from the floor, she 
noticed another spot. (Id. at 33 - 34 and 36 - 37; R. 73 - 74 and 70 - 71). 
As she wiped the second spot, she noticed a third. (Id.). This became a 
pattern as she cleaned up the spill. (Id.). 
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8. Ms. Freeman followed the spots around a corner and came 
upon Blain. (Id. at 35 - 38; R. 69 - 72). When Ms. Freeman arrived where 
Blain was located, Blain was standing and speaking with Troy Guevara, the 
assistant store manager. (Id.). 
9. It only took one or two minutes after Ms. Freeman 
discovered the spill to clean it all the way to where she found Blain and Mr. 
Guevara. (Id. at 51 - 52; R. 67 - 68). 
10. On December 12, 1998, Wal-Mart filed a Motion for 
Summary Judgment and accompanying Memorandum in Support of Motion 
for Summary Judgment. (Defendant Wal-Mart Stores' Motion for 
Summary Judgment, R. 66; Defendant's Memorandum in Support of 
Motion for Summary Judgment, R. 103). 
11. On January 8, 1999, Blain filed a Memorandum in 
Opposition to Wal-Mart's Motion. (Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition 
to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment; R. 113). Among the many 
other arguments Blain made in her Memorandum, she argued that, although 
Melia Freeman had seen a customer talking to the store manager after she 
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walked to the front of the store, the person Ms. Freeman saw was not Blain. 
(Id. at 7; R. 107). 
12. Blain offered no affidavits, interrogatories or deposition 
testimony supportive of her arguments. (Id.)-
13. On February 9, 1999, the Court filed a Memorandum 
Decision and Order granting Wal-Mart's Motion for Summary Judgment 
because Blain failed to prove that Wal-Mart had actual or constructive 
knowledge of the spill prior to Blain's fall, or that Wal-Mart had adequate 
opportunity to clean the spill after Blain's fall. (Memorandum Decision and 
Order at 2 - 3, Exhibit "C"; R. 175 - 76). 
14. Because of Blain's failure to provide any evidence 
supportive of her assertions, the Court was unable to consider her 
arguments that Freeman was not talking to Blain when she walked to the 
front of the store. (Id.). 
15. On February 25, 1999, Blain filed with the District Court 
a Motion for Relief from the Court's Memorandum Decision and Order 
under Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. (Motion for Relief 
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from Order; R. 179). Wal-Mart filed a Memorandum in Opposition and 
Plaintiff filed a Reply Memorandum. (Defendant Wal-Mart Stores' 
Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Rule 60(b) Motion for Relief from 
Order, R. 210; Plaintiffs Reply Memorandum to Defendant's 
Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Rule 60 Motion; R. 245). 
16. On March 22, 1999, the Court issued a Ruling denying 
Plaintiff's Motion for Relief from Order. (Ruling at 1; R. 211). The Court 
found in the Ruling "that Plaintiff's failure to provide any supporting 
affidavit, deposition, or other evidence in opposition to Defendant's 
supported Motion for Summary Judgment does not constitute grounds for 
Rule 60(b) relief." (Id.). 
17. Blain subsequently filed a Notice of Appeal relating to the 
District Court's denial of Blain's Rule 60 Motion for Relief and the Court's 
decision granting Wal-Mart's Motion for Summary Judgment. (Notice of 
Appeal, R. 189; Notice of Appeal, R. 260). 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
I. Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and judicial 
opinions interpreting the rule provide that a party has an affirmative duty to 
accompany a memorandum in support or opposition to a motion for 
summary judgment with evidentiary material. Public policy also favors 
attachment of evidence to preclude a party from relying on misstatements of 
testimony or even fabricated testimony. In contravention of these legal 
principles, Blain failed to attach any evidence to support her arguments in 
opposition to Wal-Mart's Motion for Summary Judgment. Furthermore, 
Blain's arguments are based on mere conjecture and speculation. Thus, the 
trial court was correct in dismissing Blain's Complaint. 
II. Blain erroneously argues that any misidentification by Melia 
Freeman of Blain creates an issue of fact on whether Wal-Mart had notice 
of the condition causing Plaintiff's fall. The record shows that this 
argument is nothing more than conjecture and would not have made a 
difference in the Court's Ruling even if the applicable deposition pages 
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would have been attached to Blain's Memorandum in Opposition to Wal-
Mart's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
The clear evidence in the record demonstrates that Wal-Mart manager 
Troy Guevara discovered Blain after she fell, that Wal-Mart employee Ms. 
Freeman cleaned up the spill as soon as she noticed it, and that directly after 
cleaning the spill, Ms. Freeman came upon Blain and Mr. Guevera. The 
trial court accurately gleaned from the depositions on record that Wal-Mart 
did not have knowledge of the spill until after Blain's fall and had no 
opportunity to clean the spill. As a result, the lower court correctly 
concluded that the evidence failed to show that Wal-Mart had notice of the 
condition or a reasonable opportunity to remedy the condition. 
III. The trial court properly granted Wal-Mart's Motion for 
Summary Judgment under the legal standards that apply to slip and fall 
cases. The Utah appellate courts have not wavered from holding that to 
make out a prima facie case of negligence against a business owner for an 
injury caused by a temporary condition, a plaintiff must produce sufficient 
evidence showing that defendant had 1) actual or constructive notice of the 
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condition, and 2) a reasonable opportunity to remedy the condition after 
having notice. 
In the instant case, the record is devoid of any evidence that Wal-Mart 
had actual or constructive notice of the spilled detergent before Blain fell. 
The record shows that Wal-Mart only noticed the spill after Blain's fall and 
immediately wiped it up. Blain's arguments to the contrary are nothing 
more than bare allegations unsupported by evidence in the record Thus, 
Blain failed to make out a prima facie case of negligence against Wal-Mart, 
and the trial court properly dismissed her Complaint. 
IV. Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides relief 
from judgment under certain circumstances, including "mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect." Blain argued that her failure 
to attach evidence supporting the arguments in her Memorandum opposing 
summary judgment constituted mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable 
neglect. 
However, rather than offering a valid excuse for her omission, Blain 
argued repeatedly in her Relief Memorandum that she thought the rule did 
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not require her to attach deposition testimony. In direct contrast to Blain's 
argument, Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires such 
attachment. Misunderstanding or misreading the law is not "mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect" warranting reconsideration. 
The trial judge did not abuse its discretion in denying Blain's Motion for 
Relief and the lower court should not be reversed. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
UTAH LAW PLACES AN AFFIRMATIVE DUTY ON A 
RESPONDING PARTY TO ATTACH SUPPORTIVE 
EVIDENCE TO ITS MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION 
TO A MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
Blain argues in her Brief that the law in Utah does not require her to 
attach or file supportive deposition testimony, affidavits, interrogatories or 
other evidence to her memorandum opposing a motion for summary 
judgment and that mere citations to page numbers in depositions are 
sufficient. Brief of Plaintiff/ Appellant at 15 - 20. Contrary to Plaintiffs 
arguments, Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and case law 
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interpreting the rule provide that deposition testimony must be filed with the 
memoranda. 
Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides in part: 
(c) Motions and proceedings thereon. The motion, 
memoranda and affidavits shall be filed and served in 
accordance with CJA 4-501. The judgment sought shall be 
rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment 
as a matter of law. 
* * * 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. 
Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal 
knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in 
evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is 
competent to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or 
certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an 
affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The 
court may permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further affidavits. 
When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as 
provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the 
mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by 
affidavits or otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth 
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If 
he does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall 
be entered against him. 
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UTAH R. CIV. P. 56(c) and (e) (emphasis added). Rule 4-501(l)(B) of the 
Utah Code of Judicial Administration further provides that a party opposing 
a motion shall file a memorandum in opposition along with all supporting 
documentation. Utah Code of Judicial Administration R. 4-501(l)(B). 
The Utah Supreme Court has reiterated and clarified these provisions, 
holding repeatedly that a party opposing a summary judgment motion has an 
affirmative duty to provide evidentiary support for the assertions they make. 
In a 1994 Utah Supreme Court case, Thayne v. Beneficial Utah. Inc.. 874 
P.2d 120 (Utah 1994), the defendant filed a motion for summary judgment. 
Plaintiff filed an opposing memorandum but failed to attach any affidavits 
or evidentiary support for his memorandum. Id. at 123. The court granted 
defendant's motion in large part because "Thayne, as the party opposing 
Beneficial's properly supported motion, had an affirmative duty to respond 
with affidavits or other materials allowed by rule 56(e)." Id. at 124 
(citations omitted). 
The case of Franklin Financial v. New Empire Development 
Company. 659 P.2d 1040 (Utah 1983), was cited by the District Court in its 
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Memorandum Decision. The Utah Supreme Court in Franklin likewise held 
that the party opposing a summary judgment motion has a duty to attach 
supportive evidence. The Utah Supreme Court stated as follows in the 
Franklin opinion: 
[W]hen a party opposes a properly supported motion for 
summary judgment and fails to file any responsive affidavits or 
other evidentiary materials allowed by Rule 56(e), the trial court 
may properly conclude that there are no genuine issues of fact 
unless the face of the movant's affidavit affirmatively discloses 
the existence of such an issue. Without such a showing, the 
Court need only decide whether, on the basis of the applicable 
law, the moving party is entitled to judgment. 
Franklin. 659 P.2d at 1044; See also Cowen and Co. v. Atlas Stock 
Transfer Co.. 695 P.2d 109, 114 (Utah 1984); Busch Corp. v. State Farm 
Fire&Cas. Co.. 743 P.2d 1217, 1219 - 20 (Utah 1987). 
Public policy also favors Wal-Mart's position on this issue. Should 
Blain's argument be accepted, an unscrupulous party could file a motion for 
summary judgment, or memorandum in opposition to such a motion, based 
entirely on misstatements of testimony or even fabricated testimony. A 
court simply could not distinguish between legitimate arguments and 
unsubstantiated contentions. To accept Blain's position would completely 
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defeat the purpose behind Rule 56 which requires a party to offer 
evidentiary support for its allegations in a memorandum. 
Blain argues in the alternative that if she was required to attach 
supportive depositions, the trial court decision was in error because Wal-
Mart attached the relevant sections of the deposition transcripts to its 
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment. Brief of 
Plaintiff/Appellant at 25-33. Plaintiff therefore argues that the Court had 
the evidence to consider. Id. 
Contrary to Blain's representations, Wal-Mart did not attach all of the 
portions of Blain's and Freeman's deposition transcripts that support Blain's 
misidentification argument. For example, in making the misidentification 
argument, Blain cited to pages 39, 41, 44 - 45 and 56 - 57 of Freeman's 
deposition transcript. Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition, Statement of 
Facts 1f1f 14 - 16; R. 109 - 10. She further cited to page 19 of her own 
deposition transcript. Id- 1 11; R. 110. In its Memorandum in Support of 
Motion for Summary Judgment, Wal-Mart did not attach pages 39, or 56 -
57 of Freeman's transcript or page 19 of Plaintiff's deposition transcript. 
C \WP5l\WAL-MART\BLAIN\appeal documents\bnef_appellee wpd 19 
Defendant Wal-Mart Stores' Memorandum in Support of Motion for 
Summary Judgment, Exhibits "A" and "C"; R. 67 - 76 and 82 - 90; 
Defendant Wal-Mart Stores' Memorandum in Reply to Plaintiffs 
Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibits 
"B" and "D"; R. 117-30 and 137 - 40. Not only did Wal-Mart not attach 
the evidence to support Blain on this issue, Blain also did not attach the 
evidence. As a result, the court correctly ruled that it had no supporting 
factual basis to consider Blain's arguments. Memorandum Decision at 2 -
3, Exhibit "C";R. 175-76. 
Blain simply cannot expect the Court to evaluate her arguments 
without support in the record for review. The deposition transcripts are not 
on file. If the party opposing a motion does not attach or otherwise file the 
evidence, the Court does not have an opportunity to review the evidence, 
and it is unfair to expect the Court to take Blain's "word for it." 
Both the governing law and public policy support the trial Court's 
decision to hold Blain to the attachment rule. Blain's arguments to the 
contrary should be declined and the trial court's ruling affirmed. 
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II. 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY GRANTED WAL-
MART'S SUMMARY JUDGMENT BECAUSE THERE IS 
NO EVIDENCE THAT WAL-MART HAD NOTICE OF 
THE SPILL BEFORE THE OCCURRENCE. 
Blain indicates in her Brief that the District Court acted "in haste" and 
did not consider Blain's factual arguments in granting Wal-Mart's Motion 
for Summary Judgment in Wal-Mart's favor. Brief of Plaintiff/Appellant at 
35-36. To the contrary, a conscientious reading of the District Court's 
Memorandum Decision demonstrates that the Court carefully considered 
every supported claim. Memorandum Decision at 1 - 3, Exhibit "C"; R. 
175-77. The only argument the Court specifically said it could not 
evaluate was the argument that Melia Freeman misidentified the customer at 
the end of the spill as Blain. Id. at 2, Exhibit "C"; R. 176. 
The Memorandum Decision shows that the judge considered the 
factual arguments supported by the attached materials and concluded that 
"there is no evidence that Defendant had knowledge of the liquid detergent 
spill until after Plaintiffs injury", and that there was "also no evidence that 
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the spill had existed for a long enough time that Defendant had constructive 
knowledge of it." Id. 
In this appeal, Blain makes much of the argument that Ms. Freeman, 
the Wal-Mart employee who discovered and immediately cleaned up the 
spill, misidentified the customer at the end of the spill as Dee Blain. 
Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition at 7; R. 107. Blain speculates that 
because the description given by Freeman does not match her own, Blain's 
fall could have occurred after the described meeting took place. Plaintiffs 
Memorandum in Opposition at 7; R. 107. As mentioned above, this is only 
one of several arguments Blain raised in her Memorandum in Opposition to 
Wal-Mart's Motion for Summary Judgment. Id. at 5 - 9; R. 105 - 09. The 
record of the case shows that the argument is nothing but conjecture and 
would not have made a difference in the Court's ruling even if the 
deposition pages were attached to the Memorandum. 
Contrary to Blain's arguments, the evidence of the case does not 
support Plaintiffs position that Blain's fall could have occurred after the 
meeting. The clear and substantiated evidence in the record shows that (a) 
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Troy Guevara discovered Ms. Blain after she fell, (b) that a female 
employee from the fabrics department arrived at the scene after Plaintiffs 
fall and told Guevara that she had cleaned up the spill and that the spill 
started back in fabrics, (c) that Melia Freeman was that employee, (d) that 
when Ms. Freeman arrived at the scene, no one, including Blain, was lying 
on the floor, and (e) when Freeman left the scene, the spill had been 
completely cleaned up. Defendant Wal-Mart Stores' Memorandum in 
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment at 2 - 4, R. 100 - 102; Defendant 
Wal-Mart Stores' Memorandum in Reply to Plaintiff's Memorandum in 
Opposition to Summary Judgment at 2 - 5 and 11 - 14, R. 163-166 and 
154 - 157; Deposition of Melia Freeman at 8, 24, 33 - 40, 43 - 45, 51 - 52 
and 59 - 60; R. 69 - 75, 118 - 124 and 129; Deposition of Dee Blain at 6, 
11 - 17 and 22; R. 82 - 89; Deposition of Troy Guevara at 48 - 49, 54-55; 
R. 144 - 147. 
The identity of any other woman speaking with Troy Guevara at that 
time is irrelevant. The relevant issue is that by the sworn testimony of Troy 
Guevara and Melia Freeman, the meeting/conversation between Guevara 
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and Freeman occurred after Blain's fall. Id. Blain offered no evidentiary 
support that the meeting/conversation between Guevera and Freeman took 
place before she fell. In fact, all sworn testimony in the case is to the 
contrary. 
Blain's argument that Wal-Mart may have knowledge of the spill 
before the fall because Freeman's description of Blain was inaccurate is 
based entirely on speculation. Blain is requesting the jury to draw an 
unreasonable inference that is not supported by the record. In deciding 
whether a plaintiffs complaint can survive a motion for summary judgment, 
the plaintiff is entitled to all "reasonable" or "fair" inferences which tend to 
prove his or her case. Allen v. Federated Dairy Farms. Inc.. 538 P.2d 175 
(Utah 1975); Burns v. Cannondale Bicycle Co.. 876 P.2d 415 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1994). A plaintiff is not entitled to inferences based on conjecture that 
are not supported by evidence in the record. Webster v. Sill. 675 P.2d 
1170 (Utah 1983). A jury is not permitted to speculate that the defendant is 
negligent. Id.; Lindsay v. Eccles Hotel Co.. 284 P.2d 477 (Utah 1955); 
Mitchell v. Pearson Enterprises. 697 P.2d 240 (Utah 1985). 
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In her Appeal Brief, Blain sets forth a list of other inferences the jury 
could supposedly make to find that Wal-Mart had knowledge of the 
substance on the floor before Blain's fall. Brief of Plaintiff/Appellant at 30 
- 33. These supposed inferences are not "reasonable" or "fair" inferences 
but bare allegations unsubstantiated by evidence in the record. An example 
is Blain's argument that a jury could infer that Freeman avoided aspects of 
her job, such as looking for safety hazards, because she admitted to 
sometimes removing her smock to avoid interacting with customers. Id. at 
31 - 32. This argument is an unreasonable and unfounded stretch of the 
evidence. Furthermore, Blain takes the testimony out of context. A review 
of the transcript shows that Freeman testified she sometimes takes off her 
smock so that she can quickly and efficiently, without customer distraction, 
clean the floor in the event of a spill. Deposition of Melia Freeman at 60; 
R. 118. This testimony is supportive of Wal-Mart's position, and it in no 
way advances Blain's case. 
There is absolutely no evidence that Melia Freeman avoided looking 
for safety hazards, or avoided promptly cleaning up the spill that caused 
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Plaintiffs fall, merely because she may have removed her Wal-Mart smock. 
To the contrary, the evidence shows that Freeman was diligent in cleaning 
the spilled substance on the day of the occurrence, and, that if she happened 
to remove her smock, it was so that she could focus on cleaning the spill. 
Deposition of Melia Freeman at 33 - 38 and 60; R. 69 - 74 and 118. 
It is also important to note that Blain raises the "smock argument" for 
the first time on appeal. The argument was not raised in the trial court and 
therefore cannot be considered on appeal. Certified Sur. Group. Ltd. v. UT 
Inc.. U.T.I.. Inc.. 960 P.2d 904, 906 n.3 (Utah 1998); Monson v. Carver. 
928 P.2d 1017, 1022 (Utah 1996). 
Contrary to Blain's arguments, the trial court carefully reviewed the 
factual evidence of this case and concluded Wal-Mart could not have known 
of the spill prior to Blain's fall and it had no opportunity to clean the spill 
prior to Blain's fall. Memorandum Decision at 1 - 3, Exhibit "C"; R. 175 -
77. Even when considering the facts in a light most favorable to Blain, the 
record reveals no genuine issue of material fact. The trial court ruled 
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appropriately in granting Defendant's Motion and Blain's conjecture and 
speculation do not justify a reversal of that ruling. 
III. 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY GRANTED WAL-MART'S 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT UNDER THE LEGAL STANDARDS 
GOVERNING SLIP AND FALL CASES. 
In advancing the arguments of liability against Wal-Mart, Blain seems 
to ignore the governing legal standards that are required to be met by an 
injured party to make out a prima facie case of negligence against a 
defendant store owner. The law in Utah provides that "'[t]he owner of a 
business is not a guarantor that his business invitees will not slip and fall. 
He is charged with the duty to use reasonable care to maintain the floor of 
his establishment in a reasonably safe condition for his patrons.'" 
Schnuphase v. Storehouse Markets. 918 P.2d 476, 478 (Utah 1996) 
(quoting Preston v. Lamb. 436 P.2d 1021, 1023 (Utah 1968); citing Martin 
v. Safewav Stores. Inc.. 565 P.2d 1139, 1140 (Utah 1977) ("property 
owners are not insurers of the safety of those who come upon their property 
even though they are business invitees.")). 
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The most recent and all-encompassing case addressing slip and fall 
law is Schnuphase v. Storehouse Markets. 918 P.2d 476 (Utah 1996). In 
Schnuphase. the Supreme Court of Utah determined that slip-and-fall cases 
fall within two general "classes" of cases. The first class of cases 
'"involves some unsafe condition of a temporary nature, such as a slippery 
substance on the floor . . . .'" Id. at 478 (quoting Allen. 538 P.2d at 
176). The second class of cases "'involves some unsafe condition of a 
permanent nature, such as: in the structure of the building, or of a stairway, 
etc. or in equipment or machinery, or in the manner of use, which was 
created or chosen by the defendant. . . .'" Id. 
With respect to the first class of cases, the Schnuphase Court 
explicitly outlined the minimum level of proof necessary to sustain a prima 
facie case: 
In this class of cases it is quite universally held that fault 
cannot be imputed to the defendant so that liability results 
therefrom unless two conditions are met: (A) that he had 
knowledge of the condition, that is, either actual knowledge, or 
constructive knowledge because the condition had existed long 
enough that he should have discovered it; and (B) that after such 
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knowledge, sufficient time elapsed that in the exercise of 
reasonable care he should have remedied it. 
Id. at 478. 
The injured plaintiff has the burden of presenting evidence showing 
that the above prerequisites are satisfied in order to make out a prima facie 
case of negligence against the defendant. Id- This showing cannot be made 
by unsupported assertions or erroneous inferences. Rather, there must be 
substantial evidence in the record to support a verdict for plaintiff. Koer v. 
Mayfair Markets. 431 P.2d 566, 568 (Utah 1967). Utah appellate courts 
have upheld a trial courts' granting of summary judgment motions and 
motions for directed verdicts on numerous occasions where plaintiff fails to 
produce adequate evidence proving notice and a reasonable opportunity to 
remedy. Id.; Lindsay. 284 P.2d 477; Mayfair Markets. 431 P.2d 566; 
Howard v. Auerbach Co.. 437 P.2d 895 (Utah 1968); Long v. Smith Food 
King Store. 531 P.2d 360 (Utah 1973); Allen. 538 P.2d 175; Martin. 565 
P.2dll39. 
The case at bar involves a temporary hazard, "a slippery substance on 
the floor"; precisely the type of case the Utah Supreme Court determined 
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would be governed by the first class of cases. Therefore, the standards 
applicable to the first class of cases are controlling here. In other words, 
Blain must establish the "notice requirements" to advance her case against 
Wal-Mart. 
Here, the record is devoid of any evidence that Wal-Mart had notice, 
actual or constructive, of the spilled soap before Blain's fall. The trial court 
in its Memorandum Decision held that 
Ms. Freeman had been cleaning the spill for one to two minutes 
when she discovered Plaintiff standing and talking to assistant 
manager Guevera after the injury. Plaintiff testified in her 
deposition that she remained on the floor for ten to fifteen 
minutes after the fall. Since Plaintiff was standing when Ms. 
Freeman found her talking to Mr. Guevera, Defendant did not 
have knowledge of the spill until several minutes after the fall. 
Memorandum Decision at 2; R. 176. 
As the trial court held, Blain failed to satisfy the two-part test outlined 
in Schnuphase. The evidence shows that Ms. Freeman had actual notice of 
the liquid detergent spill only after Blain's fall, and Freeman immediately 
wiped up the spilled soap after discovering the spill. The arguments raised 
by Plaintiff to the contrary are nothing more than bare allegations 
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unsupported by facts in the record. Dwiggins v. Morgan Jewelers. 811 
P.2d 182, 183 (Utah 1991). A review of the actual evidence in the record 
shows that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the trial court 
properly granted Wal-Mart's motion for summary judgment. Blain's 
speculation to the contrary is insufficient to withstand Wal-Mart's Motion 
for Summary Judgment. 
IV. 
BLAIN'S FAILURE TO ATTACH SUPPORTING 
EVIDENCE DOES NOT CONSTITUTE GROUNDS 
MERITING RELIEF UNDER RULE 60(b) OF THE UTAH 
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. 
Rule 60(b) provides that relief from judgment may be had under 
certain circumstances: 
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly 
discovered evidence; fraud, etc. On motion and upon such 
terms as are just, the court may in furtherance of justice relieve 
a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, 
or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly 
discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been 
discovered in time to move for a new trail under Rule 59(b); (3) 
fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), 
misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) 
the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, 
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released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is 
based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer 
equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; 
or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the 
judgment. 
UTAHR. CIV. P. 60(b). 
In the case at bar, Blain filed her Rule 60(b) Motion for Relief based 
on subsection (b)(1), arguing that her failure to submit the deposition 
testimony to the Court for consideration was "mistake, inadvertence, 
surprise or excusable neglect . . . ." Plaintiffs Memorandum in 
Support of Her Motion for Relief from Order at 5 - 7, R. 181 - 183. 
However, in advancing her Motion for Relief, Blain made no excuse for her 
failure to provide the evidence to support her opposition to summary 
judgment. Id. Indeed, she argued repeatedly that the rule does not 
require such action. Id. 
Blain had the opportunity to offer the information that would support 
her opposition to summary judgment. Her only excuse for not providing 
the court with the supportive testimony is that, according to her reading of 
the law, it was not necessary. Id. She made no indication that the omission 
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was due to clerical error or some other reason. The omission, according to 
Blain, was that she did not believe attaching the deposition testimony to her 
Memorandum in Opposition to Summary Judgment was required by the 
rules. Id. 
Blain's failure to fully research the applicable rules and case law is 
not "mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect" and neither is her 
interpretation of that law. If failure to adequately research legal authority is 
an excuse warranting relief from judgment, countless rules and statutes 
would be completely undermined. Such is not a valid excuse warranting 
reconsideration of a decision. 
In denying Blain's Rule 60(b) Motion, the trial Court found that 
Blain's failure to provide depositions and other evidence did not constitute 
grounds for Rule 60(b) Relief. Ruling dated March 22, 1999 at 1, R. 211. 
The Court was well within its discretion in making this Ruling. Larsen v. 
Collins. 684 P.2d 52, 54 (Utah 1984)(holding that trial court's ruling will 
only be reversed when there has been an abuse of discretion). 
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In arguing that the trial court abused its discretion, Blain cites the 
federal case of Blois v. Friday. 612 F.2d 938 (5th Cir. 1980). The Fifth 
Circuit Court of Appeals held in Blois that the trial court abused its 
discretion in denying plaintiff relief from summary judgment. In Blois. the 
trial court granted summary judgment to defendant because plaintiffs 
attorney failed to timely respond to defendant's motion for summary 
judgment. The reason plaintiffs attorney did not oppose defendant's 
summary judgment motion was because the attorney neglected to notice the 
district court of his new address and consequently did not receive 
defendant's summary judgment motion until the time to respond had passed. 
It is understandable that a court would grant relief for this type of 
mistake. The lawyer in Blois had no idea that a summary judgment motion 
was pending. A party's not knowing that a motion has been filed is a world 
apart from receiving notice of summary judgment, opposing the summary 
judgment, and then offering no evidence to support one's contentions. 
Blain further claims that the court committed error by raising the 
question of attachment sua sponte. Brief of Plaintiff/Appellant at 14 and 35 
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- 36. Contrary to Blain's assertion that the court voluntarily raised the 
issue, Wal-Mart, in its Reply Memorandum to Blain's Memorandum 
Opposing Summary Judgment, specifically called the court's attention to the 
fact that Blain predicated her misidentification argument "wholly on 
speculation" and failed to offer "specific facts". Defendant Wal Mart 
Stores' Memorandum in Reply to Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to 
Motion for Summary Judgment at 13 - 14; R. 154 - 155. 
Secondly, because the purpose of summary judgment is to bar from 
the court "unjustified" litigation, one of the court's very roles is to sua 
sponte raise such an issue. Reliable Furn Co. v. Fidelity & Guar. Ins. 
Underwriters. 398 P.2d 685 (Utah 1965). Finally, when the moving party 
has presented evidence sufficient to support a judgment in its favor, and the 
opposing party fails to submit contrary evidence, a trial court is justified in 
concluding that no genuine issue of fact is present or would be at trial. 
Arnica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schettler. 768 P.2d 950 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Defendant and Appellee, Wal-Mart Stores, 
Inc., respectfully requests that the Order of the trial court granting Wal-
Mart Stores' Motion for Summary Judgment be affirmed, that the Order of 
the trial court denying Appellant's Rule 60(b) Motion for Relief from Order 
be affirmed, and that the appeal of Blain be dismissed. 
DATED this / S day of November, 1999. 
MORGAN, 
Mitchel T. Rice 
Todd C. Hilbig 
Attorneys for Defendant and Appellee 
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. 
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Tab A 
191 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE Kule bU 
447 (Utah 1993); Putvin v. Thompson, 878 P.2d App. 1997); PDQ Lube Ctr., Inc. v. Huber, 329 
1178 (Utah Ct. App. 1994); Ron Shepherd Ins. v. Utah Adv. Rep. 20 (Utah Ct. App. 1997); PDQ 
Shields, 882 P.2d 650 (Utah 1994); Commercial Lube Ctr., Inc. v. Huber, 949 P2d 792 (Utah Ct. 
Inv. Corp. v. Siggard, 936 P.2d 1105 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 58 Am. Jur. 2d New Trial Amendment, after expiration of time for fil-
§§ 11 to 14, 29 et seq., 187 to 191. ing motion for new trial, in civil case, of motion 
C.J.S. — 66 C.J.S. New Trial §§ 13 et seq., made in due time, 69 A.L.R.3d 845. 
115, 116, 122 to 127. Authority of state court to order jury trial in 
AX.R. — Consent as ground of vacating
 cjvil case where jury has been waived or not 
judgment, or granting new trial, in civil case, demanded by parties, 9 A.L.R.4th 1041. 
after expiration of term or time prescribed by Deafness of juror as ground for impeaching 
statute or rules of court, 3 A.L.R.3d 1191.
 v e r d k t f o r s e c u r i n g n e w t r i a l o r r e v ersal on 
Propriety and prejudicial effect of suggestion
 a p p e a i 38 A L R 4th 1170 
or comments by judge as to compromise or ' ^ ' ^
 a g b i n Qn ^ s U t e 
settlement of civil case, 6 A.L.R.Sd 1457. £
 4 g ? 4 ? 
Necessity and propriety of counter-affidavits _ , , , . , . , . 
in opposition to motion for new trial in civil Court reporters death or disability prior to 
case 7 A L R 3d 1000 transcribing notes as grounds for reversal or 
Quotient'verdicts, 8 A.L.R.3d 335. n e w tr ial< 5 7 A-UEUth 1049. 
Propriety and prejudicial effect of instruc- Propriety of limiting to issue of damages 
tions in civil case as affected by the manner in a l o n e n e w t r i a l granted on ground of inade-
which they are written, 10 A.L.R.3d 501. 9u a cy of damages — modern cases, 5 A.L.R.5th 
Prejudicial effect of unauthorized view by 875. 
jury in civil case of scene of accident or pre- After-acquired evidence of employee's mis-
mises in question, 11 A.L.R.3d 918. conduct as barring or limiting recovery in ac-
Propriety and prejudicial effect of reference tion for wrongful discharge, 34 A.L.R.5th 699. 
by counsel in civil case to result of former trial Excessiveness or adequacy of compensatory 
of same case, or amount of verdict therein, 15 damages for personal injury to or death of 
A.L.R.3d 1101. seaman in actions under Jones Act (46 USCS 
Absence of judge from courtroom during trial Appx. § 688) or doctrine of unseaworthiness — 
of civil case, 25 A.L.R.3d 637. modern cases, 96 A.L.R. Fed. 541. 
Juror's voir dire denial or nondisclosure of Excessiveness or adequacy of awards of dam-
acquaintance or relationship with attorney in ages for personal injury or death in actions 
case, or with partner or associate of such attor- under Federal Employers' Liability Act (45 
ney, as ground for new trial or mistrial, 64 USCS §§ 51etseq.) — modern cases, 97 A.L.R. 
A.L.R.3d 126. Fed. 189. 
Rule 60. Relief from judgment or order. 
(a) Clerical mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts 
of the record and errors therein arising from oversight or omission may be 
corrected by the court at amy time of its own initiative or on the motion of any 
party and after such notice, if any, as the court orders. During the pendency of 
an appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected before the appeal is docketed in 
the appellate court, and thereafter while the appeal is pending may be so 
corrected with leave of the appellate court. 
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evidence; 
fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the 
furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a final 
judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvert-
ence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by 
due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial 
under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or 
extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the 
judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, 
or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise 
vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective 
application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the 
judgment. The motion shall be made within a reasonable time and for reasons 
(1), (2), or (3),not more than 3 months after the judgment, order, or proceeding 
Rule 60 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
was entered or taken. A motion under this Subdivision (b) does not affed 
finality of a judgment or suspend its operation This rule does not limjj 
power of a court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party fW 
judgment, order or proceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon 
court The procedure for obtaining any relief from a judgment shall K 
motion as prescribed in these rules or by an independent action 
(Amended effective April 1, 1998 ) 
Advisory Committee Note. — The 1998 
amendment eliminates as grounds for a motion 
the following "(4) when, for any cause, the 
summons in an action has not been personally 
served upon the defendant as required by Rule 
4(e) and the defendant has failed to appear in 
said action n This basis for a motion is not found 
in the federal rule The committee concluded 
the clause was ambiguous and possibly in con-
flict with rules permitting service by • 
other than personal ser\ice 
Amendment Notes . — The 1998 «• 
ment deleted the former fourth ground 
motion in Subdivision lb) as described! 
Advisory Committee Note above, and n 
bered the grounds accordingly 
Compiler's Notes . — This rule is i 
Rule 60 F R C P 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
"Any other reason justifying relief" 
—Default judgment 
—Impossibility of compliance with order 
— Incompetent counsel 
—Lack of due process 
—Merits of case 
— Mistake or inadvertence 
—Mutual mistake 
—Real party in interest 
— Refund of fine after dismissal 
Appeals 
Clerical mistakes 
— Computation of damages 
—Correction after appeal 
—Date of judgment 
Void judgment 
—Estate record 
—Inherent power of courts 
—Intent of court and parties 
—Judicial error distinguished 
—Order prepared by counsel 
—Predating of new trial motion 
Court's discretion 
Default judgment 
Effect of set-aside judgment 
—Admissions 
Form of motion 
Fraud 
—Burden of proof 
—Divorce action 
Independent action 
— Constitutionality of taxes 
—Divorce decree 
—Fraud or duress 
—Motion distinguished 
Invalid summons 
—Amendment without notice 
Inequity of prospective application 
Jurisdiction 
Mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable 
neglect 
—Default judgment 
Illness 
Inconvenience 
Meritorious 
Merits of claim 
Negligence of attorney 
No claim for relief 
— Delayed motion for new trial 
—Factual error 
— Failure to file cost bill 
— Failure to file notice of appeal 
— Nonreceipt of notice and findings 
—Trial courts discretion 
—Unemployment compensation appeal 
—Workmen's compensation appeal 
Newly discovered evidence 
—Burden of proof 
—Discretion not abused 
Procedure 
—Notice to parties 
Res judicata 
Reversal of judgment 
— Invalidation of sale 
Satisfaction, release or discharge 
—Accord and satisfaction 
—Discharging representative of estate 
further demand 
—Erroneously included damages 
—Prospective application of judgment 
Timeliness of motion 
—Confused mental condition of party 
—Dismissal for lack of prosecution 
—Fraud 
—Invalid service 
—Judicial error 
—Jurisdiction 
—Mistake inadvertence and neglect 
— Newly discovered evidence 
—Order entered upon erroneous assumpl 
—"Reasonable time " 
—Reconsideration of previously denied m< 
—Satisfaction 
Unauthorized appearance 
Void judgment 
—Basis 
—Lack of jurisdiction 
Cited 
"Any other reason justifying relief. 
Subdivision (b)(7) embodies three rec 
ments First, that the reason be one other 
those listed in Subdivisions (1) througl 
second that the reason justify relief, and 1 
that the motion be made within a reasoi 
TabB 
Rule 56 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 164 
publication was obtained by fraud is a direct 
and not a collateral attack Bowen v. Olson, 122 
Utah 66, 246 P.2d 602 < 1952). 
— Discret ion of court. 
A trial court is endowed with considerable 
latitude of discretion in granting or denying a 
motion to set a default judgment aside. Board 
of Educ v. Cox, 14 Utah 2d 385, 384 P.2d 806 
(1963) 
Where plaintiff sought relief from a default 
judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b) on three occa-
sions before three different judges and his mo-
tions were denied in the first two proceedings, 
the third judge was barred by the law of the 
case from overruling the previous orders. 
Mascaro v. Davis, 741 P.2d 938 (Utah 1987). 
—Grounds. 
Excusable neglect . 
A default certificate may be set aside upon 
grounds of excusable neglect. Heathman v. 
Fabian & Clendenm, 14 Utah 2d 60, 377 P.2d 
189(1962). 
While reliance on an attorney's assurances 
that one's rights are being protected could, in 
the appropriate circumstances, be seen as ex-
cusable neglect, trial court properly refused to 
excuse the neglect of a defendant who failed to 
establish that she was so represented. Miller v. 
Brocksmith, 825 P.2d 690 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
—Judicial att i tude. 
Where any reasonable excuse is offered by 
defaulting party, courts generally tend to favor 
granting relief from a default judgment, unless 
to do so would result in substantial prejudice or 
injustice to the adverse party. Westinghouse 
Elec. Supply Co. v. Paul W. Larsen Contractor, 
544 P.2d 876 (Utah 1975). 
—Movant's duty. 
Party who seeks to have a default judgment 
set aside must proffer some defense of at least 
sufficient ostensible merit to justify a trial on 
that issue Downey State Bank v. Major-
Blakeney Corp., 545 P.2d 507 (Utah 1976). 
— Sett ing aside proper. 
Where plaintiff served defendant with a sum-
mons, and left a copy with the defendant which 
was not the same as the original, the court had 
jurisdiction but sufficient confusion was cre-
ated so that a motion to set aside the default 
judgment should have been granted and the 
defendant allowed to plead consistent with our 
declared policy that in case of uncertainty, 
default judgments should be set aside to allow 
trial on the merits. Locke v. Peterson, 3 Utah 2d 
415, 285P.2d 1111 (1955). 
Default judgment and writ of garnishment 
were properly set aside where trial court failed 
to obtain jurisdiction over defendant because 
summons was not timely issued. Fibreboard 
Paper Prods. Corp. v. Dietrich, 25 Utah 2d 65, 
475 P.2d 1005(1970). 
Where appellants, plaintiffs in a civil action, 
promptly objected to date set for trial on the 
ground that their counsel had an already 
scheduled appearance in another court on that 
date, but due to fact that there were no law or 
motion days between time objection was filed 
and trial date, objection was never heard, re-
fusal to set aside default judgment entered 
when appellants failed to appear on trial date 
was an abuse of discretion. Griffiths v. 
Hammon, 560 P.2d 1375 (Utah 1977). 
Time for appeal. 
Under former Rule 73(h) the time for appeal 
from a default judgment in a city court ran from 
the date of notice of entry of such judgment, 
rather than from the date of judgment. 
Buckner v. Main Realty & Ins. Co., 4 Utah 2d 
124, 288 P2d 786 (1955) (but see Central Bank 
& Trust Co. v. Jensen, supra, and Rule 58A(d). 
Cited in Utah Sand & Gravel Prods. Corp. v. 
Tolbert, 16 Utah 2d 407, 402 P.2d 703 (1965); 
J.P.W. Enters., Inc. v. Naef, 604 P.2d 486 (Utah 
1979); Katz v. Pierce, 732 P.2d 92 (Utah 1986). 
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Rule 56. Summary judgment. 
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or 
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the 
expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of 
a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without 
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support*11? affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any part 
thereof. 
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or 
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, 
move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his 
favor as to all or any part thereof. 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and affidavits 
shall be filed and served in accordance with CJA 4-501. The judgment sought 
shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to 
a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in 
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a 
genuine issue as to the amount of damages. 
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule 
judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a 
trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the 
pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if 
practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial controversy 
and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It shall 
thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without substantial 
controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or other 
relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the action 
as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be deemed 
established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly. 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and 
opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such 
facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the 
affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified 
copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached 
thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be supple-
mented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further 
affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as 
provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations 
or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise 
provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a 
genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if 
appropriate, shall be entered against him. 
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits of a 
party opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by 
affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the 
application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be 
obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such 
other order as is just. 
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. Should it appear to the satisfaction of the 
court at any time that any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule are 
presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall 
forthwith order the party employing them to pay to the other party the amount 
of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused him to 
incur, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or attorney 
may be adjudged guilty of contempt. 
(Amended effective November 1, 1997.) 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DEE BLAIN, 
vs. 
WAL-MART STORES, INC., 
Plaintiff, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CASE NO. 970400626 
DATE: February 8, 1999 
JUDGE: RAY M.HARDING 
DEPUTY CLERK: Georgia Snyder 
LAW CLERK: DaveBackraan 
This matter came before the Court upon Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Having received and considered the Motion, together with memoranda in support of and 
opposition to the Motion, the Court hereby grants the Motion and delivers the following 
Memorandum Decision. 
Statement of Facts 
Plaintiff was injured when she slipped and fell on a liquid detergent spill as she was 
approaching the cashier stands at the Wal-mart in Orem. Melia Lei 0'Hawaii White Freeman, a 
Wal-mart department manager, testified in her deposition that she had been cleaning the spill for a 
minute or two when she turned a corner in an effort to continue to clean the spill trail and found 
Plaintiff standing and talking to Troy Guevera, a Wal-mart assistant manager, after the injury. 
Plaintiff testified in her deposition that she remained on the floor for ten to fifteen minutes after 
the fall. 
Opinion of the Court 
Summary judgment is proper only if there is "no genuine issue as to any material fact 
and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law " URCP 56(c). The Court must 
view the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party Higgins v. Salt Lake County. 
855 P.2d 231, 233 (Utah 1993). 
In a slip and fall caused by a temporary hazard, 
it is quite universally held that fault cannot be imputed to the 
defendant so that liability results therefrom unless two conditions 
are met: (A) that he had knowledge of the condition, that is, either 
actual knowledge or constructive knowledge because the condition 
had existed long enough that he should have discovered it; and (B) 
that after such knowledge, sufficient time elapsed that in the 
exercise of reasonable care he should have remedied it. 
Schnuphase v Storehouse Markets. 918 P.2d 476 (Utah 1996). 
The Court finds that there is no evidence that Defendant had knowledge of the liquid 
detergent spill until after Plaintiffs injury. There is also no evidence that the spill had existed for 
a long enough time that Defendant had constructive knowledge of it. Ms. Freeman testified in her 
deposition that she had been cleaning the spill for one to two minutes when she discovered 
Plaintiff standing and talking to assistant manager Guevera after the injury. Plaintiff testified in 
her deposition that she remained on the floor for ten to fifteen minutes after the fall Since 
Plaintiff was standing when Ms. Freeman found her talking to Mr. Guevera, Defendant did not 
have knowledge of the spill until several minutes after the fall. 
Plaintiff argues that it is disputed whether Defendant had knowledge of the spill before 
her fall since she testified in her deposition that she was still lying on the floor when she talked to 
Mr. Guevera and because Ms. Freeman's description in her deposition of the person she found 
standing and talking to Mr. Guevera was obviously of another woman. However, the Court 
cannot consider these arguments since Plaintiff did not provide the Court with a copy of the 
portions of the depositions which allegedly contain these statements. 
[W]hen a party opposes a properly supported motion for summary 
judgment and fails to file any responsive affidavits or other 
evidentiary materials allowed by Rule 56(e), the trial court may 
properly conclude that there are no genuine issues of fact unless 
the face of the movant's affidavit affirmatively discloses the 
existence of such an issue. Without such a showing, the Court 
need only decide whether, on the basis of the applicable law, the 
2 
moving party is entitled to judgment. Franklin Financial v. New 
Empire Development Co.. 659 P.2d 1040 (Utah 1983). 
Since Defendant's Motion and supporting portions of depositions do not affirmatively disclose the 
existence of a genuine issue of material fact, the Court has no supporting factual basis for it to 
consider Plaintiffs arguments. 
Order 
Accordingly, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby granted. 
DATED this / day of February, 1999. 
HARDING, 
cc: G. Steven Sullivan, Attorney for Plaintiff 
Stephen G. Morgan, Attorney for Defendant 
Mitchel T. Rice, Attorney for Defendant 
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